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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court recognized hostile environment sexual
harassment as a viable claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,' the Court left open the question of when the employer could
be held vicariously liable for such conduct. Referencing the applica-
bility of agency standards,2 the Court assigned to the lower courts
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
2. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
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the initial struggle of adapting traditional agency law to the sexual
harassment context.3 A decade later, however, the Supreme Court
rejected the lower-court approaches and followed its own path in an-
nouncing an affirmative defense that could relieve the employer of
liability for a supervisor's misconduct.4
The Supreme Court's creation of an affirmative defense for hos-
tile environment sexual harassment claims under Title VII was an
unexpected and unanticipated development for many commentators.5
With eight years of experience under our belts, however, the effects
and impact of the Court's liability standard are beginning to take
shape. Although the availability of this defense was no doubt a wel-
come surprise for employers from the outset, defendants' success in
using the defense has been greater than even the most optimistic ob-
server might have predicted. Using the affirmative defense on liability
has proven an effective shield to bypass consideration of the harass-
ment itself and avoid trial altogether. Even with modest evidence of
past prevention efforts, employers are often granted summary j udg-
ment on the liability issue, thereby mooting any debate on what con-
stitutes sexual harassment within the meaning of the statute.6
By reviewing a significant sample of appellate court decisions,
this article examines the impact of the liability question and how
courts have interpreted the various elements of the affirmative de-
fense. As a result, it is possible to develop a concrete set of recom-
mendations to guide both employers and employees in approaching
this issue. This examination also concludes that, notwithstanding
the courts' discussions of the various elements of the defense, often
a single factor can explain the rulings: the employer's response to the
harassment once it has been reported. Although reaching these con-
clusions sometimes twists the language of the affirmative defense
to questionable limits, the results may well satisfy the "spirit" of the
Supreme Court's position, if not the literal language.
I. THE BURLINGTON/FARAGHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The development of sexual harassment claims under Title VII
has been reviewed at length elsewhere and will be summarized only
briefly here.7 Early in the development of sexual harassment law,
3. Id.
4. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
5. See Paul Buchanan & Courtney W. Wiswall, The Evolving Understanding of
Workplace Harassment and Employer Liability: Implications of Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Under Title VII, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 65 (1999).
6. Id. at 65-67.
7. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816-26 (1991); B. Glenn
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courts were willing to hear plaintiffs' claims of "quid pro quo" harass-
ment, typically characterized by the supervisor's demand for sexual
favors in exchange for an economic benefit, such as a promotion or
raise.' In that form, sexual harassment closely resembled the more
traditional kinds of sex discrimination under Title VII where an appli-
cant or employee claims the loss of a job or employment opportunity
based on her sex. The courts were less accepting, however, of a claim
for "hostile environment" sexual harassment, where the plaintiff
alleges various forms of offensive behavior but is unable to tie that
behavior to any economic consequences in her employment.'
Hostile environment sexual harassment was first recognized by
the Supreme Court as an actionable form of sex discrimination
under Title VII in 1986.10 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, plaintiff
Mechelle Vinson claimed that her supervisor had engaged in both
sexual touching and rape but made no allegations that this behavior
impacted her pay or promotions." The Court agreed that, even absent
economic consequences, such harassment could constitute a violation
of Title VII when it became "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to al-
ter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment."
12
George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8-13
(1993); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 61 U. PIrrt. L. REv. 61 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 212-13 (9th Cir. 1979) (cause of
action existed for plaintiff who was allegedly fired for refusing her supervisor's sexual
demands); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3d Cir. 1977)
(supervisor demanded sex as a condition of continued employment); see also infra note 32.
9. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated without opinion, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
10. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. Id. at 60, 64.
12. Id. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1972)). This
discussion will be limited to the issue of liability for hostile environment harassment, as
distinguished from "quid pro quo" harassment. Harassment including economic conse-
quences, or a "tangible employment action" in the Court's current terminology involves
a different line of analysis. For these claims, also referred to as "quid pro quo" harass-
ment, the employer will be held liable for the supervisor's actions as a consequence of the
authority delegated to the supervisor by the employer. Mikels v. City of Durham, 183
F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. 1999).
Any harassing conduct that culminates in a "tangible employment action"
against the victim is necessarily conduct "aided by the agency relation,"
since it can only be taken by supervisory employees empowered by their
employers to take such action .... In that circumstance, vicarious liability
is absolute, without regard to whether the employer knew, or should have
known, or approved of the act, or sought to prevent it or stop it.
Id.; see also B. Glenn George, If You're Not Part of the Solution, You're Part of the Problem:
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 133, 141 (2001).
Because employer liability is an "automatic" consequence of the conclusion that a
supervisor's misconduct includes a tangible employment action, the distinction between
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Having recognized the viability of a claim for hostile environment,
however, the Court turned to the question of employer liability. For
"quid pro quo" harassment, the courts consistently held the employer
responsible for the supervisor's misuse of his authority. 13 Such cases
closely parallel the more traditional claims of Title VII discrimination,
such as a termination decision based on race. Thus, in other areas of
Title VII, employer liability is an undisputed "given" - employers,
acting through supervisors as agents, must answer for the supervi-
sors' misuse of delegated authority to hire, fire, or otherwise control
employment terms.14 Relying on such precedent, the court of appeals
a "tangible employment action" and "hostile environment" is frequently litigated. Compare
cases defining tangible employment actions broadly in the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits (Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (including transfers and
negative job evaluations); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (moving to
small office, limiting support services, eliminating assignments); Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118
F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1997) (unfavorable job reference); Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371,
1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (lateral transfer), cited with approval in Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d
1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000); Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1033 (10th Cir. 2004) (nega-
tive job references may constitute "adverse employment action" as an act that does more
than "de minimis harm" to plaintiffs future employment prospects)); Corneveaux v. CUNA
Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996) (requiring employee "to go through
several hoops in order to obtain her severance benefits")) with cases defining tangible
employment action more narrowly in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth circuits (Reinhold v.
Virginia, 151 F.3d 172, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1998) (extra work assignments, "inappropriate"
work assignments, and denial of the opportunity to attend a professional conference held
not to constitute tangible employment actions); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d
702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (only "ultimate employment decisions" qualify as tangible employ-
ment actions); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (transfer is not
a tangible employment action)). The Supreme Court recently responded to a developing
split among the circuit courts of appeal in the case of Burlington Northern and Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006). Rejecting a more narrow approach, the Court
agreed that a reassignment of duties (without a change in pay or status) could constitute
a "materially adverse employer action" in the context of a retaliation claim. Id. at 2406-
07. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this piece.
13. See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake
County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993); Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc.,
957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990);
Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989); Katz v. Dole,
709 F.2d 251, 256 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts'
approach. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760-61 (1998). The circuits were also
in agreement in co-worker (non-supervisor) harassment cases, consistently holding the
employer liable for the harassment only when the employer had knowledge of the mis-
conduct and failed to respond appropriately. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs.,
Inc. 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 1997); McKenzie v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473,
480 (7th Cir. 1996).
14. See Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment
Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509, 516-22 (1996) (discussing vicarious liability in employ-
ment discrimination law). As noted by the Supreme Court, "courts have consistently held
employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel,
whether or not the employer knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor's
actions." Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 70-71.
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in Vinson v. Taylor similarly had imposed on the employer strict lia-
bility for the supervisor's acts of sexual harassment. 5 The Supreme
Court rejected this approach for hostile environment cases in Meritor
Savings Bank and left open the question of when an employer would
be held liable for such misconduct. 6 In agreement with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),17 the Court charged
the lower courts to "look to agency principles" for guidance.' 8
Following the limited guidance offered in Meritor Savings Bank,
the lower courts struggled with the application of agency principles in
hostile environment cases with varying results. 9 The Supreme Court's
1998 decisions in the companion cases of Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth ° and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton2 sought to settle the con-
flict. Kimberly Ellerth, a former employee of Burlington Industries,
claimed harassment by her second-level supervisor, alleging inappro-
priate comments and touching.22 Ms. Ellerth was aware of the cor-
porate sexual harassment policy and complaint process but resigned
her position without reporting the behavior.23 Burlington won the
case on summary judgment when the trial court ruled that the em-
ployer could not be held responsible for any harassment that may
15. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
16. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 69-72.
17. The EEOC is the federal agency charged with the enforcement of Title VII. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
18. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
19. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (strict
liability); Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1327 (8th Cir.
1994) (negligence liability); Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir.
1992) (negligence liability); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1436 (7th Cir. 1988) (strict
liability). See generally George, supra note 7, at 3-8 (reviewing the development of
liability standards prior to Burlington Industries and Faragher); Frederick J. Lewis &
Thomas L. Henderson, Employer Liability for "Hostile Work Environment" Sexual
Harassment Created by Supervisors: The Search for an Appropriate Standard, 25 U.
MEM. L. REV. 667, 687-730 (offering a circuit-by-circuit review of liability cases in this
area). Cf. White, supra note 15, at 523-53 (discussing vicarious liability as applied to
hostile environment, sexual harassment).
20. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
21. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
22. Ms. Ellerth alleged that 1) her supervisor told her to 'loosen up" and that he
could make her life "very hard or very easy;" 2) the supervisor rubbed her knee and told
her she was not "loose enough" during an interview for a promotion, and 3) the
supervisor stated that shorter skirts would make Ms. Ellerth's job "a whole heck of a lot
easier." One of the central issues of the case was whether Ms. Ellerth had alleged quid
pro quo or hostile environment harassment. Hoping to take advantage of the strict
liability standard applied by the lower courts for quid pro quo harassment, Ms. Ellerth
argued that these "threats," even though never carried out, amounted to quid pro quo
harassment. The Supreme Court held that unfulfilled threats could only provide
evidence of hostile environment harassment. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 748-55.
23. Id. at 748.
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have occurred, where the employer had no knowledge of the alleged
misconduct. 4 Beth Ann Faragher, a lifeguard for the City of Boca
Raton, Florida, also alleged incidents of crude comments and unwel-
come touching by two of her supervisors.25 Although the city had a
sexual harassment policy, the policy was never disseminated to the
employees in Ms. Faragher's unit;26 thus, she was unaware of the
policy's existence and never filed a complaint.7 Nonetheless, the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the City that it could not be held liable
without knowledge of the harassment. 5
Both Burlington Industries and Faragher considered the same
issue: when can an employer be held responsible, or vicariously liable,
for supervisor harassment that was never reported by the subordinate
employee? As articulated by the Court, 'We decide whether.. . an em-
ployee who refuses the unwelcome and threatening sexual advances
of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences,
can recover against the employer without showing the employer is
negligent or otherwise at fault for the supervisor's actions."29
The Supreme Court resolved the conflict in the circuits by un-
expectedly creating an affirmative defense as a mechanism for an
employer to avoid sexual harassment liability that had occurred with-
out the employer's knowledge."0 The Court thwarted any hope of
"automatic" employer liability with its categorical statement that
"sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope
of employment."31 Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
the Court distinguished between "direct" liability (based on the em-
ployer's own behavior in failing to correct known harassment)32 and
"vicarious" liability (based on the supervisor's conduct that is unknown
24. Id. at 749.
25. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
26. Id. at 781-82.
27. Id. 781-83.
28. Id. at 783-85.
29. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1998) (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 765.
31. Id. at 757.
32. The employer's own negligence is at issue, according to the Court, once the em-
ployer becomes aware of the alleged misconduct:
Under subsection (b) [of Section 219(2) of the Restatement], an employer is
liable when the tort is attributable to the employer's own negligence. §
219(2)(b). Thus, although a supervisor's sexual harassment is outside the
scope of employment because the conduct was for personal motives, an em-
ployer can be liable, nonetheless, where its own negligence is a cause of the
harassment. An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it
knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.... [B]ut
Ellerth seeks to invoke the more stringent standard of vicarious liability.
Id. at 758-59 (emphasis added).
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to the employer).33 In considering liability for hostile environment
harassment unknown to the employer (and in the absence of any quid
pro quo or "tangible employment action"34), the Court turned to Title
VII's "primary objective" - "not to provide redress but to avoid harm."35
Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment
policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer lia-
bility to depend in part on an employer's effort to create such pro-
cedures, it would effect Congress' intention to promote conciliation
rather than litigation in the Title VII context. To the extent limit-
ing employer liability could encourage employees to report harass-
ing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, it would also
serve Title VII's deterrent purpose. As we have observed, Title VII
borrows from tort law the avoidable consequences doctrine, and
the considerations which animate that doctrine would also sup-
port the limitation to employer liability in certain circumstances.36
Consequently, the Court concluded that an employer will be held
vicariously liable for unreported supervisor harassment unless he can
establish, "by a preponderance of the evidence," a two-part affirma-
tive defense:
33. Id. at 758.
34. See supra note 13. The Court abandoned the "quid pro quo" terminology in
Burlington Industries and now refers to those types of claims as ones involving a "tangible
employment action." Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 753-54, 760-61. Where a supervisor's
conduct involves a "tangible employment action" (such as a pay raise or promotion), the
Court found clear vicarious liability: it was the agency relationship that provided the
supervisor the authority to commit the "tort." Id. at 760.
Under Section 219(2)(d), a master may be responsible for acts outside the scope of
employment where "the servant... was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence
of the agency relation." Id. at 758. The Court goes on to say:
[WIe can identify a class of cases where, beyond question, more than the
mere existence of the employment relation aids in commission of the harass-
ment: when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the
subordinate. Every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the question
has found vicarious liability when a discriminatory act results in a tangible
employment action.... Although few courts have elaborated how agency
principles support this rule, we think it reflects a correct application of the
aided in the agency relation standard.... When a supervisor makes a tan-
gible employment decision, there is assurance the injury could not have been
inflicted absent the agency relation.... The supervisor has been empowered
by the company as a distinct class of agent to make economic decisions
affecting other employees under his or her control.... Whatever the exact
contours of the aided in the agency relation standard, its requirements will
always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against
a subordinate.
Id. at 760-63.
35. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
36. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 764 (citations omitted).
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The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the em-
ployer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated
an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not neces-
sary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated
policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropri-
ately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element
of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill
the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is
not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any com-
plaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of
such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden
under the second element of the defense. 7
Thus, the employer should not be held responsible for the harassment
if the employer had an effective anti-harassment policy in place that
the employee failed to use.3"
II. THE VOICE OF EXPERIENCE: APPLICATION OF THE
BURLINGTON/FARAGHER DEFENSE
With far clearer marching orders this time around, employer
defendants and the lower courts began to refocus their attention on
issues of liability in hostile environment, sexual harassment pro-
ceedings. With almost a decade of experience from which to draw,
the cases have shown some surprising trends. The bad news for the
plaintiff and the good news for the employer is the remarkable level
of success employers have achieved in defeating harassment claims
on the question of liability. Even better news for the employer is
the fact that employers have achieved many of these successful re-
sults through summary judgment motions, avoiding trial altogether.
37. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Faragher,
524 U.S. at 807.
38. The affirmative defense is limited to the issue of supervisor harassment. The courts
had generally agreed, with approval by the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries and
Faragher, that there could be no vicarious liability for the employer for co-worker harass-
ment. See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 760 (referencing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1957)). In the case of co-worker harassment, liability is imposed only
if the employer knew (or should have known) of the harassment and failed to respond
appropriately. See, e.g., Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2005);
Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001); Woods v. Delta Beverage
Group, Inc., 274 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2001); Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
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Focusing on the liability issue thus may bypass the often more dif-
ficult question of whether the alleged conduct occurred and, if so,
whether the conduct was sufficiently egregious to constitute harass-
ment under the Act. The developing guidance under each prong of
the Burlington /Faragher defense will be considered in turn, with par-
ticular emphasis on the law of the Fourth Circuit.
A. Part One: Prevention and Correction by the Employer
The first prong of the Burlington/Faragher affirmative defense
requires the employer to establish that he took "reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior."3 This
prong, as applied by the courts, can itself be divided into the distinct
issues of prevention and correction.
1. "Reasonable Care to Prevent"
On the issue of prevention, the courts - following the guidance
of Burlington /Faragher - generally focus on the employer's anti-
harassment policy. Although some variation exists among the cir-
cuits, most courts have found that the existence of an anti-harassment
policy with a complaint procedure is sufficient to satisfy the first part
of the defense. Defeating this conclusion requires the plaintiff to pro-
duce significant evidence that would undermine the presumptive good
faith of the employer in developing and/or enforcing its policy. Thus,
soon after the Burlington/Faragher decisions, the Fourth Circuit
concluded:
[W]here... there is no evidence that an employer adopted or
administered an anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the
policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional, the existence of
such a policy militates strongly in favor of a conclusion that the
employer 'exercised reasonable care to prevent' and promptly
correct sexual harassment.40
In even more blunt terms, the Fourth Circuit has declared that
"dissemination of'an effective anti-harassment policy provides com-
pelling proof that an employer has exercised reasonable care to pre-
vent and correct sexual harassment. 41
39. Burlington Indus., 52 U.S. at 765.
40. Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).).
41. Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc. 259 F.2d 261,268 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting
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In spite of its sweeping statements, the Fourth Circuit has dem-
onstrated its willingness to look beyond the mere existence of an anti-
harassment policy.42 Both the terms of the policy and the employer's
practices under the policy can undermine the claim that the policy
alone provides an effective means of prevention. In Smith v. First
Union National Bank, for example, the plaintiff alleged a variety of
gender-based ridicule by her supervisor, including remarks that "the
only way for a woman to get ahead at First Union was to spread her
legs"43 and that female employees who were upset must be "men-
struating"44 or "needed a 'good banging."'45 On another occasion, the
supervisor leaned over the plaintiffs chair and, in reference to the
O.J. Simpson trial, stated that "he could 'see why a man would slit a
woman's throat."'46 The Fourth Circuit reversed summary judgment
for the employer on several grounds but explicitly noted that the em-
ployer's anti-harassment policy could be considered "defective" and
"dysfunctional" by a jury because of policy language suggesting that
sexual harassment necessarily involved sexual advances.47 Thus, the
plaintiff might reasonably have concluded that the conduct of her
supervisor did not constitute harassment under the policy.4"
In another unpublished opinion by the Fourth Circuit, the court
again reversed a summary judgment granted by the district court
because of evidence that the employer's anti-harassment policy had
been seriously undermined by the remarks and behavior of senior
management.49 In Williams v. Spartan Communications, the plaintiff
presented several pieces of evidence to support her contention that
the employer had effectively sabotaged its sexual harassment policy
and training by the unchecked actions of various management em-
ployees. ° Among other things, senior management made no attempt
Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998)); see also Barrett
Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 40 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting plaintiffs argument
that dissemination of policy alone was inadequate); Dowdy v. North Carolina, 23 Fed.
Appx. 121 (4th Cir. 2001); Silver v. General Motors Corp., 225 F.3d 665 (4th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished disposition); Riffle v. The Sports Auth., Inc., 210 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished disposition).
42. See, e.g., Smith v. First Union Bank, 202 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2000).
43. 202 F.3d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 2000).
44. Id. at 238.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 239, 245-46. When the plaintiff finally complained about the behavior, the
employer conducted a cursory review of the supervisor's "management style" and in-
structed him to "smile more." Id. at 245-46.
47. Id. at 245.
48. First Union Bank, 202 F.3d at 245.
49. Williams v. Sposton Commc'ns, 210 F.3d 364 (Table), 2000 VL 331605 (4th Cir.)
(unpublished opinion).
50. Id. at *2.
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to stop lewd conversations and jokes in the workplace, and one man-
ager commented that his secretary was fired because she refused to
give him a "blow job."'" Another manager commented at the conclu-
sion of sexual harassment training, "does this mean we can't fuck
the help any more,' ' n a company vice president commented in
reference to a group of female employees, "I've stepped over better
than that just to jack off."53 In addition, the company's policy arguably
discouraged reporting by warning that "bad faith" accusations under
the policy could subject the accuser to disciplinary action; at the same
time, the policy contained no provisions that protected employees
from retaliation for reporting under the policy.'
Other courts have found employer prevention efforts inadequate
or potentially inadequate (leaving the question for trial) when the em-
ployer had no written policy explicitly directed at sexual harassment.
For example, cases have rejected as ineffective to prevent sexual
harassment an employer's general assertion of an "open door" policy
for employee complaints,55 the absence of any policy specifically pro-
hibiting sexual harassment, 6 and oral statements that harassment
would not be tolerated, where there was no written policy.5" Even
with a specific sexual harassment policy in place, courts have found
policies ineffective when the policy fails to provide a complaint mech-
anism that bypasses the supervisor55 or fails to adequately identify
individuals to whom complaints should be made under the policy.59
In Gentry v. Export Packaging Company, for example, the
Seventh Circuit considered a policy that stated employees should
submit their complaints to "Human Resources Representatives" but




54. Sposton Commc'ns, 2000 WL 331605, at *2-3.
55. Robles v. Cox & Co., Inc., 154 F.Supp. 2d 795 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
56. Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2000).
57. EEOC v. Rotary Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
58. O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 2001); Thomas v. BET
Soundstage Rest., 104 F.Supp. 2d 558 (D.Md. 2000).
59. Gentry v. Export Packaging Company, 238 F.3d 842, 847-48 (7th Cir. 2001)
(reversing summary judgment and leaving for a jury the issue of whether employer effec-
tively implemented its policy when it failed to identify "Human Resources Represen-
tatives," who were listed in the policy as individuals to whom sexual harassment could
be reported). But cf. Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc., 347 F.3d 1272 (11th
Cir. 2003) (upholding summary judgment in favor of employer whose policy failed to
identify 'Organizational Effectiveness' representatives" to take complaints but did make
clear that complaints would be handled by human resources department, providing em-
ployees adequate guidance for filing complaints).
60. Gentry, 238 F.3d at 847.
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unwilling to conclude that the policy as written was adequate to
establish the employer's reasonable efforts to prevent harassment.6'
Instead the court left to the jury the issue of whether the policy's
failure to specifically identify the individuals to whom harassment
complaints should be made could render the policy ineffective and
thus defeat the employer's attempt to prove the affirmative defense.62
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Walton v. Johnson & Johnson
Services, Inc. found it sufficient that the policy made clear complaints
were to go to the human resources department, even though the pol-
icy failed to specifically identify the "Organizational Effectiveness"
representatives referenced."
2. 'Reasonable Care to... Correct"
Under the second part of Burlington/Faragher's first prong, the
courts are to consider the employer's efforts "to correct" sexual harass-
ment.' Here the courts have focused on employer response to actual
complaints. When applied in circumstances where the employee never
complained of the harassment to the employer, as was the case in
both Burlington Industries and Faragher, the courts have looked to
the employer's responses to prior complaints of harassment, if any.
In other words, the courts have examined whether the employer has
demonstrated the effectiveness of its policy by following through on
complaints filed by other employees. For those courts that fail to dis-
tinguish between cases involving harassment known to the employer
(usually through the employee's complaint) and cases involving ha-
rassment unknown to the employer,65 the cases may also consider
the employer's response to the harassment in question in the case
at hand.6
In considering the defendant's "reasonable care to... correct,"67
the courts examine the efforts of the employer to investigate allega-
tions made. In most cases, a prompt and serious investigation, with
some meaningful consequences for any harassment found, is suffi-
cient to satisfy the correction requirement under the Burlington/
Faragher defense and insulate the employer from liability.6" The
61. Id. at 848.
62. Id.
63. Walton, 347 F.3d at 1287.
64. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
65. See infra Part II.C.
66. See Smith v. First Union Bank, 202 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2000).
67. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
68. See, e.g., Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1176-78 (9th Cir. 2003)
(summary judgment for defendant where employer responded promptly and reasonably
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courts generally will not second-guess the severity of sanctions im-
posed on the harasser, as long as the employer has acted reasonably
to prevent a reoccurrence of the misbehavior.6 9
Where the harassment has been reported to the employer, the
liability question often turns on the employer's response to that com-
plaint. The case of Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology
offers a good example. The plaintiff in that case was employed as a
secretary for a professor at the defendant university." She became
involved in a sexual relationship with her supervisor, allegedly to pro-
tect her job, although there were no explicit threats.7' Holly D. made
no complaint to university officials, and the defendant first learned
of the allegations from a charge filed with the EEOC.72 The university
immediately placed the plaintiff on paid leave while it conducted an
investigation.73 The professor in question denied the relationship, and
the investigating committee concluded that it did not have sufficient
evidence to substantiate the plaintiffs claims. 4 Nonetheless, the com-
mittee recommended that the plaintiff be transferred to another
position and that the professor be reminded of the university's policy
on sexual harassment.75 During the actual litigation, however, the
plaintiff produced a coat that had a stain of semen that was matched
to the professor, evidence she had refused to provide during the in-
ternal investigation.76 Once this evidence was available, the univer-
sity immediately forced the professor to resign his position.77
in conducting investigation, even though its first investigation found insufficient evidence
to support's plaintiffs claim of harassment, which later proved to be true); Barrett v.
Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262,267 (4th Cir. 2001) (employee never filed com-
plaint but employer conducted investigation and fired supervisor within a week of learn-
ing of supervisor's behavior); Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2000)
(employer conducted in-depth investigation and suspended supervisor); Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1999) (summary judgment for defendant
where prompt response to complaint with investigation and punishment established
reasonable care to correct harassment); Brown v. Perry, 1999 WL 504814 (4th Cir. 1999)
(summary judgment for defendant; employer acted reasonably when supervisor complied
with plaintiffs decision not to report first harassment incident to management); Murray
v. City of Winston-Salem, 203 F. Supp. 2d 493 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (employer investigated
plaintiff complaint and gave supervisor written warning).
69. See, e.g., Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 1999) (ruling that
reprimand for harasser and transfer of victim to another supervisor were reasonable re-
sponses intended to prevent future harassment).
70. Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1162.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1164-65.
73. Id. at 1165.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1165.
76. Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1164, 1165 n.7, 1178.
77. Id.
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In addition to the employer's efforts to "correct" the alleged
harassment in Holly D. through its investigation, the university sup-
plied evidence of its "prevention" efforts through the existence of an
anti-harassment policy, as well as training efforts and other commu-
nications designed to remind the campus community of the policy
and its prohibitions.7" The Ninth Circuit upheld summary judgment
for the employer in the Holly D. case, based in part on the defendant's
prompt response and serious investigation as soon as it learned of
the plaintiff's allegations.79 The fact that the defendant's investiga-
tion was later found to be in error was held not to undermine the
employer's reasonable efforts to "prevent" and "correct" sexual harass-
ment in the workplace."0
Where the employer has ignored an employee's complaint or
conducted only a superficial investigation, the issue of liability will
be left to the jury." The Fourth Circuit case of Smith v. First Union
National Bank again proves instructive. When the plaintiff finally
complained about her supervisor's behavior, described previously, the
employer's investigation focused on the supervisor's "management
style." 2 The employer never asked the supervisor to confirm, explain,
or deny the various sexual comments he allegedly had made to the
plaintiff." At the end of a cursory investigation, the employer only
cautioned the supervisor about his management style and told him
to "smile more. ' 4 Although the plaintiff was transferred to a position
that no longer reported to the supervisor, her office remained in close
physical proximity to the accused. 5
78. Id. at 1177.
79. Id. at 1177-78.
80. Id. at 1177.
81. See, e.g., Homesley v. Freightliner Corp., 61 Fed. Appx. 105 (4th Cir. 2003)
(employer ignored plaintiffs complaints and supervisor's behavior); EEOC v. R&R
Ventures, 244 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2001) (jury question on employer's reasonableness in
promptly correcting harassment where plaintiff told she was overreacting, complaint by
another employee was ignored, and employer failed to investigate or take corrective action
when plaintiffs mother complained; summary judgment reversed); Nichols v. Azteca Rest.
Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) (failure to promptly correct where employer did
not investigate the complaint or discuss allegations with alleged perpetrator; only response
was "spot checks" and telling plaintiff to report any reoccurrences); Ogden v. Wax Works,
Inc. 214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000) (employer minimized plaintiff complaints, conducted
limited investigation focusing on plaintiffs performance, and forced plaintiff to resign);
White v. New Hampshire Dep't. of Corr., 221 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2000) (jury question
whether investigation handled promptly and defendant allowed conduct to continue);
Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 20 F.Supp. 2d 1333 (D. Kan. 1998) (evidence supporting jury
verdict included employer's failure to talk to plaintiff, alleged harasser or witnesses as
part of "investigation" into plaintiffs complaint).
82. Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 245 (4th Cir. 2000).
83. Id. at 240, 245.
84. Id. at 246.
85. Id. at 245-46; see also Clegg v. Falcon Plastics Inc., 174 Fed. Appx. 18, 2006 WL
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B. Part Two: Plaintiff's Failure to Take Advantage of Corrective
Opportunities
For those advising the potential plaintiff in a sexual harassment
claim, the lessons of Burlington/Faragher are unambiguous: report
it to your employer. A plaintiffs failure to utilize an employer-provided
complaint process generally will doom the plaintiffs claim, regard-
less of the harassment involved.
1. Unreasonable Failure "To Take Advantage of Any
Preventive or Corrective Opportunities Provided by the
Employer " 6
The second prong of the Burlington/Faragher defense requires
the employer to prove that the plaintiff "unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."87 As a vicarious liability
standard for harassment unknown to the employer, as was the case
in both Burlington Industries and Faragher,s8 the plaintiffs failure
to utilize the internal complaint procedure offered in an "effective"
anti-harassment policy generally is adequate to satisfy the employer's
burden. 9 Plaintiffs regularly argue that such failures are "reason-
able," because of fear of retaliation, embarrassment, or discomfort,
but the courts have rarely been sympathetic to such claims if only
generalized apprehensions are involved.9 ° The courts have reasoned
887937, at *5 (3d Cir. 2006) (jury question of reasonableness where employer presented
evidence of prompt response to complaint, but plaintiff claimed she had to request action
on multiple occasions and that employer seemed "annoyed" by her complaints).
86. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
87. Id.
88. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998) (finding plaintiff never
complained to upper management about the harassment); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 748 (1998) (noting plaintiff failed to notify her employer despite knowledge
of a sexual harassment policy).
89. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
90. See, e.g., Howard v. City of Robertsdale, 168 Fed. Appx. 883, 888 (11th Cir. 2006)
("conclusory allegations of feared repercussions are insufficient to overcome an employer's
showing of unreasonableness); Williams v. Mo. Dept. of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972,977
(8th Cir. 2005) (holding that alleged "shame, shock and humiliation" did not justify failure
to report); Harper v. City of Jackson Mun. Sch. Dist., 149 Fed. Appx. 295,301-02 (5th Cir.
2005) (finding claim of intimidation inadequate and unsubstantiated); An v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 94 Fed. Appx. 667, 675 (9th Cir. 2004) (fear of losing family and job); Holly
D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 n. 24 (9th Cir. 2003); Reed v. MBNA Mktg.
Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003) ("more than ordinary fear or embarrassment is
needed"); Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 270 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding "nebulous fear" of retaliation inadequate); Shaw v. Autozone, Inc.,180 F.3d 806,
813 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that embarrassment and fear of retaliation did not justify
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that most victims in these circumstances will be uncomfortable filing
a complaint;91 to excuse the reporting requirement based on these
common concerns would effectively nullify this element of the affir-
mative defense and undermine the Supreme Court's goal of effec-
tuating Title VII's "deterrent purpose"92 and the statute's goal of
"promot[ing] conciliation rather than litigation."93
To succeed in establishing the reasonableness of a failure to use
available complaint procedures, a plaintiff must produce concrete evi-
dence beyond her generalized fears, such as the employer's failure to
respond to prior claims of sexual harassment94 or prior incidents of
retaliation against prior complainants.95 In EEOC v. R&R Ventures,
for example, the plaintiff presented evidence that three different man-
agers ignored her or told her she was "overreacting" when she com-
plained about the supervisor's behavior,96 that the defendant also
ignored a harassment complaint of another employee,97 and that the
employer took no corrective action when the plaintiffs mother com-
plained on her behalf.9" The Fourth Circuit concluded that the evi-
dence was sufficient to go to the jury on the question of whether the
employer had acted promptly or reasonably to "correct" issues of
harassment under the Burlington/Faragher affirmative defense.99
The courts have also demonstrated some sympathy for particu-
larly vulnerable victims of harassment in excusing the reporting re-
quirement. 100 In a case involving especially egregious circumstances,
the First Circuit in Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc. agreed
that the "reasonableness" of the plaintiffs failure to complain to the
defendant was a question for the jury.11 Evidence included that the
failure to report), cited with approval by Watkins v. Profl Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29842, at *28 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion)).
91. See Reed, 333 F.3d at 35; Shaw, 180 F.3d at 813.
92. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 764.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. R&R Ventures, 244 F.3d. 334, 337-38 (4th Cir. 2001)
(plaintiff complained without recourse and was told she was overreacting).
95. Id. at 338 (finding plaintiff was verbally assaulted by her harasser for reporting
his conduct and was later forced to quit due to drastically decreased work hours).
96. Id. at 337.
97. Id. at 337-38.
98. Id. at 337.
99. Id. at 341. The trial court had granted summary judgment on the grounds that
the conduct in question "was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work
environment." Id. at 338.
100. See Reed v. M.B.N.A. Marketing, 333 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting plaintiff
was only seventeen at the time of the incident and was threatened with termination);
Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 61 (2nd Cir. 1998) (finding plaintiff was
functionally literate).
101. Reed, 333 F.3d at 37.
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victim was only seventeen years old °2 and that her supervisor forced
her to perform oral sex, threatened her with termination if she re-
ported the incident, and told her that his family was closely tied with
the company management. °3 Similarly, in Distasio v. Perkin Elmer
Corp., the Second Circuit concluded that the jury had sufficient evi-
dence to find the plaintiffs failure to report was reasonable where
the plaintiff was a functionally illiterate immigrant and had been
threatened.104
Plaintiffs have sometimes created a bind for the employer by re-
porting the harassment but then requesting that no action be taken. '05
When the plaintiff later sues, she may argue that the employer's fail-
ure to investigate and remedy the situation bars the employer from
asserting the Burlington/Faragher defense."° The employer, in turn,
may respond that the plaintiff has unreasonably failed to utilize the
employer's complaint process.107 Although some employers have pro-
ceeded to investigate known harassment even without a complaint
or cooperation from the alleged victim, 08 the courts generally have
not faulted the employer for honoring the plaintiffs explicit request
not to pursue an investigation.' 9 In Hardage v. CBS Broadcasting
Inc.,"' for example, the plaintiff told a company manager about the
harassment but explicitly stated that he wanted to handle the situ-
ation by himself.' When the manager spoke to the plaintiff a second
time to follow up, the plaintiff again insisted that he did not want the
manager involved." 2 "By specifically requesting the company not
make use of its remedial and preventative procedures, Hardage un-
reasonably failed to make use of CBS's anti-harassment policies and
procedures.""' 3
102. Id. at 30.
103. Id. at 30, 37.
104. Distasio, 157 F.3d at 64-65.
105. See Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999); Hardage v. C.B.S.
Broadcasting, 427 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2005).
106. Hardage, 427 F.3d at 1186 (plaintiff argued that defendant did not attempt to
remedy the harassment suffered by plaintiff by failing to investigate his complaint even
after plaintiff opted to handle the situation alone).
107. Id. at 1188.
108. See, e.g., Holly D. v. California Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting the university's investigation after receipt of a letter from the E.E.O.C. but prior
to the Title VII claim).
109. Hardage, 427 F.3d at 1186 (noting plaintiffs desire to handle the situation alone
would normally negate the need for CBS to correct the situation).
110. Id. at. 1177.
111. Id. at 1182.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1188; see also Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (employer
cannot be faulted for failing to investigate and take corrective action at plaintiffs request).
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As noted, many courts apply the Burlington/Faragher affirma-
tive defense for all claims of hostile environment harassment, even
when the plaintiff reported the harassment.114 On its face, the plain-
tiffs report would seem to render the defense unavailable to the de-
fendant, because the plaintiff, by definition has not "failed to report."
In spite of this apparent disconnect, the courts overcome this diffi-
culty by focusing on the plaintiffs delay in reporting as the "failure"
to report.'15 This allows the court's analysis to shift back to the issue
of how the employer responded once the complaint was made as the
deciding factor in the employer's argument to avoid liability."6 In
Howard v. City of Robertsdale, for example, the plaintiff waited al-
most three years before reporting the harassment.1 7 When she did
complain, the employer immediately placed the victim on paid leave
and hired an investigator to look into the allegations."' Both prongs
of the affirmative defense, the court concluded, thus were satisfied.
1 19
2. Unreasonable Failure "To Avoid Harm Otherwise"2 °
The second part of the Court's test - the plaintiffs obligation
"to avoid harm otherwise" '121 - apparently has been litigated with
much less frequency. Even the most sympathetic reader may be left
scratching her head to understand the behavior of the plaintiff in
Brown v. Perry.'22 While attending an out-of-town conference, Wendy
Jo Brown was the last remaining guest at a party in a hotel suite
hosted by one of the company managers, William Boyd.'23 When Ms.
Brown later tried to leave the suite, Mr. Boyd allegedly "pushed her
against the wall, and kissed her face and neck."'24 Ms. Brown immedi-
ately reported the incident to her supervisor.'25 After speaking with
114. See, e.g., Perry, 184 F.3d at 396-97 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that although plaintiff
reported the harassment, the employer properly invoked the affirmative defense because
a proper sexual harassment policy was in place, post-reporting management supported
plaintiff, and she failed to avoid the harm).
115. See, e.g., Montero v. AGNO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 1999) (two year delay
in reporting considered unreasonable); An v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 94 Fed. Appx.
667, 675 (9th Cir. 2004) (nine-month delay in reporting).
116. See Montero, 192 F.3d at 863 (noting even after two-year delay in reporting, the
defendant responded within eleven days by investigating and taking action on plaintiffs
complaint).
117. Howard v. City of Robertsdale, 168 Fed. Appx. 883, 885 (11th Cir. 2006).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 888.
120. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
121. Id.
122. 184 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 1999).
123. Id. at 390.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 390-91.
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another supervisor, Ms. Brown decided not to file a formal com-
plaint,'26 and Mr. Boyd later apologized for his behavior. 2 7 Six months
later, Ms. Brown attended another conference at the same hotel and
again attended a party in Mr. Boyd's hotel suite. 2 ' Once again, Ms.
Brown was the sole remaining guest after others had left. 2 9 She and
Mr. Boyd left the hotel and went to two different bars over the course
of the next hour.30 When they returned to the hotel, Ms. Brown agreed
to return to Mr. Boyd's hotel room (after Mr. Boyd promised he would
not touch her).' 3 ' Once in the hotel room, however, Mr. Boyd kissed
and groped Ms. Brown, but she again managed to free herself and
leave the room.'32 This time, Ms. Brown did file a formal complaint
under the employer's policy, and the employer ordered Mr. Boyd not
to have any further contact with Ms. Brown. 3 At the conclusion of
the investigation, Mr. Boyd received a thirty-day suspension.'
In upholding summary judgment for the defendant, the Fourth
Circuit noted (in addition to the company's investigation and corrective
action) that Ms. Brown "utterly failed to 'avoid harm otherwise"':135
By her own account, Brown voluntarily decided to remain alone
in Boyd's hotel room with him at night during the September con-
ference even though the March incident was fresh in her mind.
Brown not only remained alone with Boyd in his room for a
second time, she also accepted Boyd's invitation to visit first a
pub and then a reggae bar following the party. Finally after the
bar-hopping, Brown agreed to return to Boyd's hotel room at mid-
night. In light of her previous history with Boyd, no reasonable
factfinder could reach any conclusion other than that Brown
"unreasonably failed ... to avoid harm."'"
C. Distinguishing Liability Standards for Unknown Harassment
and Reported Harassment - Does It Matter?
As noted, in circumstances where the plaintiff has reported the
harassment under the employer's sexual harassment policy, the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 391.





133. Id. at 390-92.
134. Perry, 184 F.3d at 392.
135. Id. at 397.
136. Id.
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Burlington/Faragher affirmative defense would seem to be inapplica-
ble and requires an illogical result if strictly applied. Assume an em-
ployee promptly reports sexual harassment by her supervisor, and
the employer responds immediately with a thorough investigation
and severe sanctions for the perpetrator. A literal application of the
Burlington/Faragher affirmative defense would make it impossible
for the employer to avoid liability because he is unable to establish
the second prong of the defense, the plaintiffs unreasonable failure
to take advantage of corrective opportunities. The result is counter-
intuitive and at odds with the Court's very purpose in creating the
affirmative defense as a means to encourage employers to prevent
and correct these issues internally. Consistent with the agency prin-
ciples upon which the Court relied in establishing the scope of em-
ployer liability, 3 ' an examination of the employer's own negligence
in responding to the complaint would provide a more direct and logi-
cal means of addressing the liability question.
138
Although the failure of some courts to distinguish between cases
of unknown harassment and reported harassment may require some
mental gymnastics to "fit" the Burlington/Faragher defense, the con-
fusion may not impact the bottom-line results. Where the employer
has disseminated an anti-harassment policy with a complaint pro-
cedure, and the harassment is unreported - the circumstance in
which the affirmative defense was intended to apply - the plain-
tiff's failure to utilize that policy should prove determinative (absent
additional evidence that the employer has discourage reporting under
the policy in some way). Where the plaintiff has reported the harass-
ment, arguably removing the claim from the Burlington/Faragher
defense, the liability question likely will turn on the employer's re-
sponse to that complaint under either the Burlington/Faragher
defense or a negligence standard. Under either approach, identical
results may be expected for similar fact patterns.
139
Under the more straightforward "negligence" standard for re-
ported harassment, courts simply will examine the reasonableness
of the defendant's investigation and remedy for any harassment.140
137. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758-59 (1998).
138. See id. at 758 ("A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless ... the master was negligent or
reckless...") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957)). For a more
complete discussion of the distinction between vicarious liability for harassment unknown
to the employer and "direct" liability for the employer's response to reported harassment,
see B. Glenn George, If You're Not Part of the Solution, You're Part of the Problem:
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 142-50 (2001).
139. See E.E.O.C. v. R&R Ventures, 244 F.3d 334,341 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting plaintiff
made multiple complaints and defendant never took corrective action).
140. Id. (finding defendant's failure to correct the harassing behavior after repeated
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If applying the Burlington /Faragher affirmative defense instead, the
courts similarly will begin with an examination of the reasonableness
the employer's response to the complaint under the first prong of the
defense as part of the obligation to correct issues of harassment.
4 1
If the prevention and correction prong is satisfied, the courts have
often dispensed with the second prong of the affirmative defense by
pointing to any delay in the plaintiffs reporting as an unreasonable
failure to take advantage of the employer's complaint process. 142 Under
either standard, a flawed or inadequate investigation or response will
defeat the employer's effort to escape liability, either by establishing
the employer's negligence or by establishing the employer's failure
to correct under the first prong of Burlington/Faragher.
141
III. RISK MANAGEMENT
A. Lessons for the Employer
The lower courts have fleshed out the requirements of an effec-
tive anti-harassment policy under the Burlington/Faragher affirma-
tive defense in relatively concrete terms. The good news for employers
is that this evolution of case law has provided clear guidance for
avoiding hostile environment, sexual harassment liability.
1. Prevention: Drafting and Implementing an Effective Anti-
Harassment Policy
In drafting a policy that will maximize its likelihood of success-
fully using the defense, an employer would be well-advised to include
the following elements:
A specific policy governing sexual harassment or a dis-
crete section discussing and including sexual harass-
ment in a broader anti-harassment or anti-discrimina-
tion policy;
A definition of sexual harassment that includes both
romantic/sexual overtures and gender-based behavior
that is degrading and/or insulting;
complaints failed to establish the defendant exercised reasonable care).
141. Id. (assessing response to plaintiffs complaint based on a standard of "reasonable
care to promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior").
142. See Montero v. AGNO Corp., 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999).
143. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
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A specified complaint process that includes options for
complaining to someone other than one's supervisor;
A prohibition of retaliation for filing a complaint under
the policy; and
Means of regular distribution and access to the policy.'"
2. Correction: Responding to Reports of Alleged Harassment
Equally important for the employer's successful affirmative de-
fense is the handling of any reports under the policy's complaint pro-
cedure. Delayed or inadequate responses may become evidence both
for a claim resulting from the current report, as well as future com-
plaints. Indeed, poor handling of past complaints may justify the
failure of employees to report future complaints, thus establishing the
second prong of the Burlington/Faragher defense and rendering the
defense unavailable.
Case law surveyed suggests the following "best practices" to
maximize the possibility of avoiding liability for any harassment that
does occur:
The employer should promptly initiate a response and
investigation of any formal or informal reports made.
Pending the conclusion of the investigation (and de-
pending on the severity of the alleged harassment and
the circumstances of the parties involved), the employer
should consider separating the parties. This may in-
clude removing the alleged victim from the supervision
of the alleged harasser by means of temporary reas-
signments or paid leave for one or both parties. If the
parties are not separated during the investigation, the
alleged harasser should be warned to avoid any unnec-
essary or unprofessional contact with the complainant.
The investigation itself should be conducted by an indi-
vidual or committee who can be objective. At a mini-
mum, the investigation should include interviews or
statements from the complainant, the alleged perpe-
trator, and any witnesses identified by the parties. Even
144. Some employers require new employees to sign a statement acknowledging receipt
of the company's anti-harassment policy. Although no court has suggested this practice
is required, employers may find it useful evidence to establish the employee's knowledge
of available policies and complaint procedures. Similarly, evidence of training and regular
reminders of the policy's prohibitions is helpful to establish the employer's prevention
efforts, but the courts have not demanded such efforts as a prerequisite to establishing
the Burlington/Faragher defense.
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an erroneous finding of no harassment may protect
the employer if the investigation has been reasonably
serious and thorough.
If the investigation concludes that the harassment oc-
curred, the employer should consider responses that are
most likely to prevent any reoccurrence. The severity
of the punishment imposed is not determinative, and
courts generally will not second-guess this decision if
it was a good-faith effort to resolve the problem. For
example, a warning to the harasser and permanently
transferring the victim to another unit may be adequate
in cases of less severe harassment.
If the accused remains in the workforce, the employer
should periodically follow-up with the complainant to
ensure there have been no further incidents, especially
if the two parties remain in close working proximity.
B. Lessons for the Plaintiff
From the victim's perspective, the list of "best practices" is far
shorter and much simpler. The message for the employee/victim of
sexual harassment is unequivocal: report the misconduct to the em-
ployer through whatever means are offered. If the employer responds
promptly and reasonably to the report with a serious investigation
and significant consequences for the accused, a potential claim has
effectively evaporated in most cases. Although the courts have oc-
casionally excused this obligation to report where there have been
threats or concrete evidence that retaliation is the likely result of
such a report, most justifications for the failure to report have been
rejected. A cautious attorney or advisor could rarely be confident in
recommending (or condoning) a client's refusal to use the internal
complaint mechanism provided. A client determined to bypass her
employer and have her "day in court" is likely to be disappointed,
regardless of the severity of the harassment in question.
C. The Role of Summary Judgment
A common assumption of civil procedure is the difficulty of ob-
taining summary judgment on a claim or issue on which the moving
party carries the burden of proof.'45 Nonetheless, employers have been
145. See, e.g., Fairbrother v. Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 53 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[Glranting
judgment as a matter of law for a party who bears the burden of proof is an extreme step
that may be taken only when the evidence favoring the movant is so one-sided that, absent
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remarkably successful in hostile environment sexual harassment liti-
gation in obtaining summary judgment on the liability affirmative
defense provided by Burlington/Faragher.146 Where the employer is
able to present evidence of a policy with complaint procedures and
the plaintiffs failure to use that policy, courts routinely have granted
summary judgment in the absence of concrete evidence produced by
the plaintiff to refute those elements. For the employer, this presents
an important strategic option that bypasses serious consideration of
the supervisor's misconduct. Once in trial, the employer may well be
concerned that all of his good-faith efforts to prevent and correct the
harassment will be overshadowed in the jury's minds by the super-
visor's offensive conduct. The affirmative defense thus has become
an even more powerful vehicle for defeating sexual harassment claims
than might have been anticipated.
CONCLUSION
In creating an affirmative defense in Burlington Industries and
Faragher, the Supreme Court stated its intent to effectuate Title
VII's focus on prevention.147 The lower courts' implementation of the
defense has gone a good distance to educate the employer and en-
courage companies to adopt policies likely to prevent or quickly elim-
inate sexual harassment in the workplace. While some victims of
sexual harassment may be dismayed by the potential inability to
"make the employer pay" for his supervisor's misdeeds, others will
no doubt be gratified by the incentives for more immediate resolution
and the chance to just get back to work.
adequate evidentiary response by the nonmovant, it could not be disbelieved by a reason-
able jury."' (quoting 9 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 50.05
(2004))) (considering summary judgment for the defendant under Burlington/Faragher).
146. See, e.g., Matvia, Inc. 259 F.2d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d
at 392-93; Woods v. Delta Beverage Group, Inc., 274 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2001); Indest
v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1999); Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods,
Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2005); Holly D., 339 F.3d 1158, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2003).
147. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (quoting Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 407 (1975)).
